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Introduction            
 
This chapter aims to assess the tensions and contradictions that exist between the European 
Union’s (EU) internal and international legal obligations to achieve gender equality in all its 
activities, and its engagement in the global competitive economy. The context of the 
economic relations negotiations between the EU and the Asian region provides an excellent 
vantage point to highlight the significant difficulties in diffusing gender norms through the 
medium of trade and the consequences of not doing so.   
 
The EU promotes itself as a world leader in democratic values (including gender equality), 
international climate change and environmental negotiations and has ambitions to lead the 
global debate on sustainable development (see inter alia Manners 2002, 2008; Aggestam 
2008; Lightfoot & Burchell 2005; Vogler & Stephen 2007; Allwood et al. 2013; Bain & 
Masselot 2013). Using discourse and legal analysis, this chapter demonstrates that in all these 
areas and “as a policy entrepreneur in the field of gender” (David and Guerrina 2013, 53), the 
EU raises the expectation of changes in diffusing these “universal values” (preamble of the 
Lisbon Treaty). However, despite the existence of legal obligations and much political 
rhetoric, it is argued that the EU succumbs to internal and external resistance to the 
promotion of fundamental values. Such values as gender equality appear to clash with the 
EU’s desire and interest to foster good economic relations with key rising markets. The EU 
economic relations with Asia have focussed almost exclusively on the promotion and 
facilitation of trade and investment to enhance economic growth, through the negotiation of 
far-reaching trade agreements and have left virtually no space for facilitating the inclusion of 
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a gender dimension. Ultimately, this benefits EU-Asian trade, at the expense of promotion of 
core EU values such as gender equality. This paper argues that the lack of reflexivity has 
implications for the EU’s external actions and its own internal order. 
 
By way of disclaimer, it is appropriate to note here that this chapter is not intended to serve as 
“testing grounds for the universalization of western social sciences” (Mitchell 2003, 98). 
While acknowledging the heterogeneity of women across the Asian region, the chapter 
recognises nevertheless that gender as an analytical category has universal relevance. Women 
as a group are more vulnerable to poverty because of unequal distribution in income and 
assets, access to credits, business services, control over the income and structural gender 
market biased (UN ESCAP 2013). It is also recognised that “gender” should not be 
understood as “women” but that women are part of “gender” (Derichs 2013, 126). Gender is 
a relational term, which includes men and women. In this paper “gender” points to a set of 
learned qualities and behaviours influenced by such factors as education or economics and 
which is expected as a role from men and women .  
 
This chapter starts by providing a critical assessment of the legal background to the EU’s 
obligations in the field of gender equality (part 1). It then points towards the EU official 
policy on trade, which reveals a systemic failure to implement gender equality norms into this 
aspect of its foreign policy (part 2). Against this backdrop, the chapter investigates the 
impacts of the lack of gender perspective on trade negotiations in the Asian region (part 3). 
The final section of this chapter addresses the external resistance to EU (weak) attempts at 
linking its trade policy with broader values including social and gender rights. It assesses 
critically these external barriers specifically related to the Asian region and the consequences 
for the EU’s relationship with that region of the world as well as for the EU internal policy 
(part 4). 
 
1. The EU’s obligations and commitments to gender equality in external relations 
 
The EU has entrenched the principle of “gender equality as one of the central missions and 
activities of the Union” (Bell 2011, 629) and one of its fundamental values (Koukoulis-
Spiliotopoulos 2008). Indeed, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) proclaims 
that equality is one of the values on which the Union is founded. As such, the EU has an 
obligation to take into account the principle of gender equality when planning and enacting 
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any types of legislation. This so-called obligation of gender mainstreaming (Pollack and 
Hafner-Burton 2000) is now contained in Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and provides that “[i]n all its activities, the Union shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.” Thus, a gender 
dimension should be incorporated in every single area of the EU’s activity (including trade).   
 
The obligation to achieve gender equality has further been confirmed as a constitutional 
fundamental right legally guaranteed by Article 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(the Charter), which provides that “[e]quality between women and men must be ensured in all 
areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the 
maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the 
under-represented sex.” 
 
The constitutionalisation of gender equality law has also triggered its externalisation. The 
expansion of the scope of EU gender equality under the EU Treaty has had international 
impacts. Indeed, the Treaty gives to the EU competences relating to freedom, security and 
justice to which equality between women and men apply. Article 21(1) of the TEU outlines 
clearly that the EU’s Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy “shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law” (emphasis added). In addition, the European Commission’s 
Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men (2006 – 2010) and the Strategy for Equality 
between Women and Men (2010-15) cover both internal and external EU policies with a view 
to improving the coherence between these two pillars. The Strategy provides in particular that 
“equality is one of five values on which the Union is founded. The Union is bound to strive 
for equality between women and men in all its activities” (European Commission 2010). In 
relation to gender equality in external actions, the Strategy states that “EU policy on the 
promotion of gender equality within the EU is closely linked to the work undertaken by the 
Union in third countries. Through all relevant policies under its external action, the EU can 
exercise significant influence in fostering gender equality and women’s empowerment 
worldwide.” It further adds that the “EU will continue to use its development policies to 
promote gender equality and women’s empowerment.” As a result, any international action 
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undertaken by the EU must be guided by the principle of EU gender equality and should be 
included in the EU’s relationship with third countries. The highest law of the EU has 
therefore clearly established a strong commitment to a reflective
1
 process involving 
consideration of gender norms within and outside the boundaries of its territory in all policy 
areas.  
 
At the international level, the EU’s most powerful tools for normative extension have been 
development cooperation and trade, both of which are potentially areas where the EU’s 
powerful normative action could be use to their fullest capacities in relation to the acceptance 
and implementation of EU values, and engagement with multilateral bodies. The EU has been 
relatively successful in incorporating the promotion of gender equality norms into some of its 
development policies, as for instance in the context of the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals and the co-operation and development in the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific regions (Allwood 2013, Arts 2006). By contrast, the EU-Asia co-operation and 
development policy was, from the outset, directly linked to the growing economic and 
political power of the Asian region (European Commission 1994, 2001). It has left little space 
for influence of general EU policy on co-operation and development in particular over the 
commitment to gender equality and gender mainstreaming (Masselot 2013).  
 
Unfortunately, the tension between the EU gender equality agenda and competing economic 
interests is even more evident in the EU's trade policy towards the region. As Asian 
consumers gain purchasing power, Europe has become more concerned with negotiating 
access to these emerging markets. Negotiations for comprehensive free trade agreements 
(FTA) between the EU and Asian states commenced in 2007 and are accompanied by the 
negotiation of overarching Framework Agreements (FA) that establish the legal basis of the 
relationship. FAs incorporate many of the EU's normative concerns, including sustainability, 
nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism cooperation, support for multilateral 
organisations, yet they do so in non-binding terms (Horn at al. 2010). More importantly, 
gender equality is conspicuous for its absence in the EU’s trade policy, as subsequent sections 
reveal, despite it being an EU value, and despite DG Trade’s acknowledgement that “as we 
pursue social justice and cohesion at home,
2
 we should also seek to promote our values, 
                                                 
1
 Reflexivity here means that there is a state of consistency between the internal and the external EU actions 
(David and Guerrina 2013).  
2
 Acknowledging the unequal effects of trade liberalisation, 'Global Europe' establishes the European 
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including social and environmental standards and cultural diversity, around the world” 
(European Commission 2006, 5).   
 
The existence of tension between market needs and equal rights is not new and therefore it is 
not surprising to find the same struggle in EU-Asian trade relations. Commitment to equality 
has always been entangled with economic and market based considerations (Holskyns 1996). 
In reality, the neo-liberal project and economic considerations have often taken precedence 
over fundamental rights (MacRea 2013) despite legal statement to the contrary.
3
 However, 
what we witness in the context of trade negotiations with the Asian region is the complete 
abdication of the EU in engaging with (gender) equality in order to complete the economic 
project of market liberalisation, open competition and free market. Arguably this is not 
merely an issue of competing policies areas but it can be construed that the EU is not acting 
within its legal constrains and boundaries. 
 
2. Genderless Trade Policy 
 
As the EU’s oldest external policy, trade policy has always served economic and broader 
foreign policy objectives (Baldwin 2006). On the one hand, the policy has always had a 




By establishing a customs union [...] the Member States intend to contribute, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Globalisation Fund to help stem some of the negative effects, and 'Trade, Growth and World Affairs' aims to 
extend and simplify the fund. 
3
 Indeed in C-270/97 Deutsche Post v Sievers & Schrage [2000] ECR I-929, the Court of Justice held 
unambiguously that the economic aims are now only secondary to the social aims, therefore providing a clear 
ideological motivation for the application of European Union law. See also Case 149/77 Defrennes (no. 3) 
[1978] ECR 1365, paragraphs 26 and 27; Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission, 
[1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16, and Case C-13/94 P. v S. and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, 
paragraph 19; (Arnull 1990, Docksey 1991). 
4
 Studies of the EU's trade policy have highlighted its inherent bias towards free trade and liberalisation. 
Proponents of the collusive delegation thesis argue this derives from the institutional arrangement whereby 
member states transferred EU trade policy to the European Commission, creating a principal-agent 
relationship (Elsig 2007), which isolated the Commission from the protectionist impulses of domestic 
economic sectors (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999, Meunier 2000). Others argue the policies result from 
competition amongst interest groups and effective lobbying of the European Commission and member states 
(De Bieve and Dür 2005, Dür 2008). Focusing on effective lobbying, the Corporate Europe Observatory think-
tank based in Brussels, (see Eberhardt and Kumar 2010) maintains that the business lobby's access to the 
European Commission and other institutional actors is reflected in a liberal trade policy focused on opening 
markets abroad for services and investment, which downplays the possible negative effects of trade 
liberalisation. The complex interactions between principals, agents, interest groups and the folding of foreign 
policy aims into trade policy have led Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (2006) to describe the EU as a 
“conflicted trade power”. 
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conformity with the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering 
of customs barriers (Article 110 of the Treaty founding the European Economic 
Community, 1957). 
The emphasis on liberalisation represents a material interest-driven policy, and an 
institutional ideational belief in the developmental power of trade (see Garcia 2013). 
Particularly under the stewardship of Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (1999-2004), the 
EU’s trade policy was discursively linked to its development policy goals, and attempts were 
made to articulate Lamy’s ‘managed globalisation’ concept, which subordinated trade policy 
to multilateralism, sustainability and social justice (Meunier 2007) at the WTO (see Abdewal 
& Meunier 2010). On the other hand, being the EU's earliest and most ‘communitarised’ 
external policy, trade policy was also used to pursue other foreign policy aims (Smith 2006, 
Baldwin 2006), inter alia democratisation, regional integration or stability, albeit with mixed 
results (see Garcia 2012, Youngs 2004).  
Commitments to external norm promotion are reflected in DG Trade’s policy, even in the 
liberal and competitiveness driven post ‘Global Europe’ policies, which acknowledge “we are 
paying systematic attention to coherence with development policies, such as poverty 
eradication and insisting on the promotion in trade negotiations of sustainable development 





Normative promotion in the EU’s trade policy revolves around the incorporation of a 
democracy clause in FAs, which makes the FTA contingent on respect of human rights and 
the rule of law. Recent FTAs also seek to externalise the concept of sustainability through the 
incorporation of social and environmental sustainability clauses. Social sustainability in terms 
of EU trade policy is defined in narrow terms as referring to ‘decent work’ and to upholding 
the core conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Other social issues such 
as poverty reduction, health and education matters or discrimination are absent from the 
scope of action of DG Trade and its frame of reference, even though some of its actions in the 
field of trade could impact upon these matters (e.g. liberalisation of health services in FTAs). 
                                                 
5
 In 2006 Commissioner Peter Mandelson published the ‘Global Europe’ trade policy which focuses on market 
opening, especially in emerging markets, pursuing comprehensive ‘deep’ trade agreements including public 
procurement, services, competition policy and intellectual property rights, and is driven overall by a concern 
with “competitiveness” (Woolcock 2007) Commissioner Karel De Gucht's 2010 'Trade, Growth and World 
Affairs' trade strategy follows the same lines.  
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DG Trade’s social focus, thus, lies in the field of basic workers’ rights and basic labour 
standards. Perhaps not surprisingly, of the EU’s values an normative objectives, breach of 
these abroad could result in trade advantages for partners as they can realise lower labour 
costs, and in a worst case scenario social dumping, which could lead to downward pressures 
on EU internal employment and social policies.  
 
Not surprisingly, the DGs most closely engaged with the Neo-liberal economic project are the 
least likely to implement gender mainstreaming strategy or to recognise that their policy and 
activities are in any way gendered (MacRae 2013). DG Trade’s limited interpretation of 
social sustainability translates into policies that fail to explicitly incorporate some of the EU's 
mandated values. EU trade documents, for instance, lack any explicit mention to gender 
mainstreaming or to equality, unlike the EU’s development policy. In one of her studies, 
Holskyns notes that DG Trade has no time, little expertise to do work on gender and that 
despite the existence of mainstreaming programmes, officials did not believe that they had 
any responsibility in addressing gender (2004, 15). Debusscher and True (2008) have 
highlighted the absence of systematic gender mainstreaming in DG Trade, and the lack of a 
dedicated gender officer, which other external action DGs have had. In particular DG 
Development would appear to have made the greatest head-way in gender mainstreaming, in 
part Debusscher and True (2008) argue as a result of the lobbying of action networks (e.g. 
Women in Development Europe WIDE). Through its collaboration with UN Women, the EU 
has developed training materials for gender considerations, but these apply only to 
development planning and aid delivery mechanisms and not to trade (Gender Matters 2013). 
Although concerns about women issues in poverty alleviation are present in the EU’s 
development policy, these are not translated into Trade policy, despite seeking coherence with 
development policies. To some extent DG Trade’s concern with sustainability, especially 
regarding labour standards and environmental consequences includes women, however, no 
specific references to equality are made, making it easy for specific issues to fall off the 
negotiation agenda.  
 
3. EU's FTA negotiations with Asian states: the impact of gender absence 
 
Despite the absence of a gender mainstreaming culture in DG Trade, as the European 
Commission has associated gender equality with issues of development, there is some generic 
incorporation of these matters in EU’s FTA negotiations with developing and emerging states 
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in Asia. All the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs)
6
 for the region take account of 
gender matters by looking at women education and employment rates, and through UN 
Human Development Indicators, but this focus on development indicators furthers the 
development-gender link. The SIA for the EU-South Korea FTA, claims that “no significant 
adverse effects on gender can be forseen” (IBM Belgium 2008, 15), despite acknowledging 
that age discrimination at work affects women more than men in Korea (IBM Belgium 2008, 
65). More significantly, the final FA with South Korea, for instance, only mentions in Article 
22 that the parties “agree to cooperate in the field of employment and social affairs” and that 
“cooperation may include gender equality” among other issues mentioned. The EU-Korea FA 
did commit Korea to join the ILO and apply the core conventions. This is expected to have an 
impact on “decent work” and impact all workers, be they men or women (IBM Belgium 
2008, 65). The SIA for negotiations with ASEAN, looking at similar indicators as well as the 
UN Human Development Indicators highlighted that with the exception of Singapore, women 
suffer more poverty in ASEAN, have lower literacy rates and work mainly in the services 
sectors and agriculture and that the FTA could result in a worsening of the gender balance in 
employment (ECORYS 2009a, 117, 123).
7
 In the case of EU-India negotiations, the SIA 
claims that as the textile sector concentrates a high proportion of women workers in India, 
and the FTA is likely to result in increased exports to Europe, the effect will be more jobs for 
women (ECORYS 2009b, 164). However, the SIA recognises that the overall impact on 
existing gender inequalities in high-skilled jobs will be negligible (ECORYS 2009b, 294). It 
merely suggests technical assistance to support Indian productivity and support for India's 
own programmes in favour of education, training and employment for the low-skilled and 
low-skilled women (ECORYS 2009b, 396). As negotiations with various ASEAN states 
(Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand are ongoing) and the texts agreed with Singapore are awaiting 
signature and not available, it is impossible to determine at the time of writing whether more 
gender elements will be incorporated in these agreements. What the FTA with Korea has 
highlighted, however, is the EU's insistence on extending international ‘decent work’ 
                                                 
6
 Since the early 2000s DG Trade commission’s independent studies to consider the potential effects of FTAs on 
the EU and partner states so as to incorporate that knowledge into the negotiations. The Civil Society Dialogue 
and though the Sustainability Impact Assessments stakeholders’, including social actors’, interests in the 
negotiations are fed-into trade policy. Critics argue civil society positions are heard but rarely make it into the 
actual negotiations with partners (Maes 2009). Moreover, SIAs tend to have a pro-liberalisation bias in-built as 
they tend to model for positive growth in trade and investment once barriers are removed, and their 
quantitative methodology overlooks sectors where little data is available (i.e. informal sector, and which may 
disproportionately affect women) (Sprecht 2009). 
7
 In 2007 the EU launched FTA negotiations with ASEAN, but these were abandoned in 2010 and replaced with 
individual negotiations with the most advanced economies in ASEAN. 
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standards of the ILO, and the absence of specific gender clauses or even the reliance on 
CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women) (True 2009). Thus, in a case of competing cross-cutting issues, it is clear that the EU 
has prioritised ‘decent work’ for its trade negotiations. 
 
Extending compliance with international agreements on labour (ILO) and environmental 
standards has been a particular normative goal supported by the European Parliament (EP) in 
an attempt to achieve coherence between internal and external policy making. It also 
represents a way to articulate the neo-liberal project with the Human and social rights 
framework (True 2009). The ILO standards are particularly relevant to the gender norms 
agenda setting because they include the principles of non-discrimination on ground of sex 
(ILO Convention 111) and equal pay for men and women (ILO Convention 100) as well as 
being relevant to women who more often than men hold insecure and precarious employment 
conditions. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has become more involved 
in oversight of the European Commission whilst it undertakes negotiations with third parties, 
enhancing its leverage in getting its position taken into account in the negotiations. In a 
Resolution dated 11 May 2011 on negotiations with India, the EP argued in favour of the 
inclusion of “legally binding clauses on human rights, social and environmental standards 
and their enforcement, with measures in the event of infringement” (EP 2011), a view 
reiterated by the European Economic and Social Committee (2011). The European 
Commission and Member States share these priorities, which successfully appear in the 
Framework Agreements that accompany the FTAs with South Korea, Central America, Peru 
and Colombia (European Union 2010a, 2012a, 2012b). 
 
Commitments to social and environmental clauses notwithstanding, the EU has been 
criticised for insisting on ‘deep’ trade8 negotiations with developing states, and in particular 
for the inclusion of services liberalisation in negotiations. From a gender perspective the 
incorporation of these matters in FTAs with Asia has been considered particularly worrying. 
Ranja Sengupta and Narendra Jena (2009) argue that liberalisation of health services could 
lead to pricing-out vulnerable sectors, especially low-income women, and to a loss of 
qualified health and care personnel in India, if the liberalisation in labour movement for 
                                                 
8
 ‘Deep’ trade refers to the incorporation of issues in trade relations that go well-beyond traditional matters of 
tariffs and quotas as restrictions to trade, and include the harmonisation of partners’ phytosanitary measures 
and various standards, intellectual property rights, competition policy, liberalising the rules for service 
provision (including movement of people), and opening access to public procurement markets. 
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service provision that India is pushing for is included in the FTA. Women in Development 
Europe (WIDE) warn of constraint policy space as result of the inclusion of services and 
public procurement in the negotiations which may hinder India’s government’s possibilities 
of using policies to empower vulnerable social groups (Paulus 2009, 8, Wichterich and 
Menon-Sen 2009). WIDE’s overarching criticism is that in separating negotiations of social 
(including gender) and environmental chapters, these concerns are segregated from the rest of 
the negotiations and are therefore not mainstreamed into the various trade sectors (Wichterich 
and Menon-Sen 2009, 37). Significantly, negotiations in other trade sectors may result in 
damaging outcomes that contradict the very values the EU is trying to protect and promote in 




The underlying irony is that whilst the EU supports normative exports and has mandated 
itself to actively pursue this in Lisbon under Article 21 TEU, DG Trade’s commitment to 
‘deep’ trade (see Young and Peterson 2006), as unequivocally expressed as a warning to other 
Asian states by Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht (2010) himself when he announced the 
launch of FTA negotiations with Singapore: “we are not available to do shallow FTAs,” may 
be hampering the incorporation of that normative agenda into trade policy.  
 
‘Global Europe’ and ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ trade policies, designed in the 
shadow of a blocked WTO Doha Development Round, both focus on pursuing the EU’s 
material interests, and externalising liberalisation as mandated by Article  206 TFEU. The 
policies prioritise negotiating FTAs with partners with large market potential and higher 
barriers to EU trade (European Commission 2006, 11), and the liberalisation of services, 
public procurement markets and regulatory regimes (European Commission 2010, 6).
10
 
Various studies argue that without further access to emerging markets in these controversial 
areas, the EU stands to gain little in economic terms from enhanced relations and FTAs with 
these (ECORYS 2009a & b, Decreux et al. 2007). DG Trade’s insistence on these matters 
                                                 
9
 This is particularly relevant as the different chapter will be negotiated in detail by different officials, possibly 
form different Ministries. Prior to the creation of the European External Action Service in the Lisbon Treaty, 
the FAs were negotiated by officials from the Commission's DG Relex, while the FTA part was negotiated by 
DG Trade. Although the parties' chief negotiators have a global vision of the agreement it is unreasonable to 
expect them to have every single detail and possible interference of one article with issues elsewhere in the 
treaty. 
10
 Emerging and developing partners have criticised the EU’s and USA’s insistence on these ‘deep’ trade matters 
at the WTO and in FTAs. NGOs and civil society groups have also critiqued the fact that these issues would 
restrict future policy space, a concern that has also been raised by gender-sensitive critiques of this neoliberal 
trade model (Sen 2005, Shivpuri 2010), 
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stems from here, yet, they could, ironically undermine the norm-driven aspects of the EU’s 
Trade and FTA policy. 
 
 4. The external rejection of the EU normative promotion of gender equality 
 
Reflexivity and norm diffusion are both influential over the way the EU as an external actor 
(and a self-proclaimed normative leader) is able to shape global gender equality value. As we 
have seen there is great disparity between the EU’s internal rules and its external EU relations 
with regards to the application of gender equality norms. This lack of reflexivity is 
compounded by the fact that the EU’s actions cannot only be judged on its endeavour to 
diffuse its fundamental values but also on the level to which these values are adopted 
(Browning and Christou 2010). Arguably the process is twofold: without the actual import, 
there is no export of EU values. 
 
Beyond internal inconsistencies, a core difficulty lies in persuading partners to accept the 
EU's intentional linkage of trade with other norms. Europe’s developing and emerging 
partners have protested the inclusion of sustainability and environmental clauses in 
negotiations. India has objected to their inclusion in the FTA, as it sees these as a form of 
European protectionism (Paulus 2009, 7), which is consistent with the widely held 
perspective in India that the EU is a “protectionist club” (Lisbonne de Vergeron 2006, 25). 
For example, Indian small and medium producers may struggle to comply with EU 
environmental certification requirements and sanitary and phytosanitary standards for 
imports, and critics argue that EU requirements tend to benefit larger firms and agricultural 
producers (Wichterich 2009, 17). 
 
In terms of social clauses, trade unions from around the world affiliated to the International 
Trade Union Confederation are strong supporters of EU core values inclusion in FTAs, 
however, other civil society groups question their usefulness. Naila Kabeer (2004) fears that 
enforcement of labour standards through trade sanctions could increase labour market 
inequalities through a shift of jobs towards the informal sector where those labour-standards 
would not be applied and lead to fewer women in employment. Likewise, Kevin Kolben’s 
(2006) analysis of the issue in India, found wide-spread opposition to the inclusion of labour 
standards in FTAs across government and civil society members (excepting trade unions) as 
they were feared that their effect would be to protect Western markets from cheap goods, 
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thereby adversely affecting trade and employment in India.  
 
Objections to this comprehensive approach by the EU have been raised in particular by all its 
Asian partners, a region that has held non-interference in domestic matters as a centre-piece 
of ‘Asian values’. 11 Thus, even a developed and highly competitive state like Singapore has 
lengthened FTA negotiations with the EU due to systematic objection to the inclusion of 
sustainability and environmental clauses in the agreement (Europe World 2010), which could 
interfere with its domestic policies on these matters.  South Korea, too, had important internal 
debates about the FA, the EP and EU's general FTA/FA approach.
12
 Significantly, when the 
conclusion of negotiations with Singapore was announced in December 2012 (pending legal 
team oversight before signing at the time of writing) no announcement was made on the 
conclusion of the Framework Agreement (FA) that was being negotiated alongside the FTA, 
which was finalised in June 2013. Prior to this, FTAs and FAs had either been completed 
simultaneously, or FAs had preceded FTAs, as the EU used the ‘carrot’ of trade to gain 
acquiescence for broader regulatory and normative aims in the FAs. Negotiations with 
Malaysia and Vietnam which were launched in 2010, only entered actual negotiations in late 
2012 (DG Trade 2013) again due to differences over the EU’s mandated comprehensive 
approach to FTAs, covering WTO-plus liberalisation,
13
 as well as sustainability and 
environmental matters (Malaysia Digest 2011).  
 
The case of negotiations with India represents this fundamental objection even more clearly. 
As a democratic state India shares many of the EU’s values, which should facilitate 
agreement in these matters. However, as Nivedita Sen and Balu Nair (2011, 434) argue in 
reference to the incorporation of human rights (including social and labour rights) in FTAs, 
India “is of the opinion that such an issue does not belong in a market opening agreement”. In 
the first round of EU-India negotiations in 2007 the issue of human rights was not raised 
(Business Standard India 6.7.2007), but the EU subsequently incorporated the issue, as part 
of its global approach to FTAs, and as result of domestic pressure by civil society citing 
                                                 
11
 ‘Asian values’ refer to Asian doctrines of developmentalism based on Confucian communitarian values, 
rejection of Western liberal democracy and foreign interference in domestic affairs. For a summary of the 
debates around the concept see Thompson 2001. 
12
 From authors' discussions with Korean trade official. 
13
 WTO-plus liberalisation refers to the inclusion in bilateral or plurilateral agreements of issues that are not 
being negotiated in the WTO Doha Round, in particular competition policy, intellectual property rights, 
government procurement and services. Attempts by the EU and USA to include these in the WTO negotiations 
were blocked by emerging states, and were withdrawn from the agenda after the collapse of negotiations at the 
2003 WTO Cancún Ministerial Meeting.  
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labour abuses in India (EU, 2010b). Fears have been expressed in India that as a consequence 
of the European Parliament's greater trade supervisory powers since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
there is no certainty that human rights will not be used as a trade weapon by the EU (Business 
Standard India 13.4.2010).
14
 However, the EU’s soft law approach to these issues, as in the 
enforcement mechanism of the EU-Korea FTA which is through cooperation, and expert 
panel advice, is unlikely to result in the aggressive stance feared by Indian and other Asian 
partners (Sen and Nair 2011, 435). This notwithstanding, Asian partners perceive the EU’s 
comprehensive approach as domineering and intrusive, and the EU as a mighty trade 
competitor whose normative projection could hamper punctual economic interests of 
partners. 
 
Ultimately, whilst the gender-development nexus has been established within the EU, the 
gender-trade nexus is largely absent. Instead, it has collapsed into the labour aspects of the 
concept of sustainability in trade relations. More importantly, with weak enforcement 
mechanisms in FAs for the non-trade matters negotiated alongside market opening in FTAs, 
normative extension through FAs and FTAs will remain limited, especially as long as partner 
states systematically oppose the linking of trade and normative issues. OECD partners such 
as Canada, Australia and New Zealand are likewise reluctant to sign FAs that may affect trade 
agreements with the EU.
15
  As the EU embarks on negotiations with the USA a similar 
situation is likely to arise, further limiting the EU's future ability to link the trade incentive in 





 5. Conclusion 
 
The narrative reveals that the EU has developed strong gender equality legal obligations 
framed in constitutional and fundamental terms. Moreover, the EU is unambiguously 
politically and legally committed to achieving gender equality in its internal order and its 
external actions via the process of gender mainstreaming. This is clearly visible in both the 
EU’s legal obligations and the rhetoric displayed in co-operation and development policy 
documents. However, when considering the EU’s trade policy, explicit references to equality 
                                                 
14
 EU-India negotiations have been mired by different economic interests of the parties (see Khorana and 
Perdikis 2010, Khandekar 2012, Modwel and Singh 2012, Khorana and Garcia 2013). 
15
 From authors' discussions with trade officials. 
16
 Furthermore, as McGuire and Lindeque (2010) argue, the greater economic relevance of emerging markets is 
also lessening the EU’s potential for exploiting the attraction of its market. 
14 
 
are conspicuous for their absence. Arguably, the prospect of access to key rising markets 
weakens the EU engagement to achieve gender equality by creating a compromise between 
economic gain and fundamental value. This is compounded by the absence of gender 
mainstreaming, which is otherwise used as the main method to export the EU value of gender 
equality (e.g. in development policy). 
 
The rejection of EU gender equality values (as well as other human and social rights) from 
the Asian region contributes to the further weakening of the EU’s ability to implement gender 
equality through its broader social sustainability principles. A fundamental problem lies in the 
fact that other actors in Asia regard this normative insistence as a protectionist reflex on the 
EU’s part. Even states with similar social standards to the EU reject its legalistic approach in 
linking of these matters to trade agreements. It is, thus, not always a case of rejection of the 
values per se, but of the EU’s mechanism for their extension via conditionality clauses in its 
Framework Agreements with applicability to the FTAs. 
 
The nature of the EU as a normative power relies on the soft advocacy of Human rights and 
democratisation. These values are at the core of the EU historical and fundamental raison 
d’être. The consequence of compromising these values for economic gain is serious on many 
levels. Indeed, the EU’s economic power is supposed to serve as a springboard for diffusing 
fundamental and democratic values to third countries (Manners 2002, McCormick 2007). 
David and Guerrina (2013, 56) therefore ponder rightfully the logic of the EU: “If norms are 
the cart, economic power is the horse. The question is, has the EU put the cart before the 
horse?”  The EU genderless external trade relations send a negative message about the EU 
priorities. Moreover, the concession on fundamental norm-setting and the lack of coherence 
between the internal and the external EU actions also impacts on the EU’s identity building 
(Bain and Masselot 2013), arguably creating a “double identity” (Stratigaki 2004, 5). 
 
The EU’s inability or unwillingness to implement the general principle of gender equality 
through international actions creates a lack of reflexivity, which in turn compromises the EU 
as a gender actor, as an international normative power. The inconsistencies between the EU 
internal and external value norms create an overall watering down of the internal (universal) 
value and precipitate the retrenchment of well-established fundamental values. This in turns 
provides space for increasing internal challenges (David and Guerrina 2013). It also opens up 
further pockets of resistance or rejection in other area of EU external actions, for instance in 
15 
 
cooperation and development. Already, we note a seriously weak standard for gender equality 
norms in cooperation and development in the Asian region (Masselot 2013) which only 
parallels the absence of core EU value in external trade policies in the same region. It further 
encourages countries which normally would be more willing to accept EU values to reject 
them. Ultimately, these challenges and resistance pose the question of the credibility and the 
global reputation of the EU (Schimmelfennig 2001), casting serious doubts about the EU’s 
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